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From the Chairman
The Newsletter again, and so soon. On
behalf of all of us here thanks to those
who sent us messages of encouragement
after last year’s, and to those who have
contributed to the production of this one.
We have for some years been aware
of gradually rising student numbers in
the Cambridge Philosophy Tripos,
fuelled by a steady rise in the number of
applications. But recently the steady rise
has become a flood, resulting in a
statistic that some will find startling:
there are more applications to
Cambridge for Philosophy than for
Computer Science. And when it comes
to ratios of applications to admissions
in the University Philosophy is very
close to the top – only Architecture is
significantly higher, Economics, Law
and the Vet School, with their obvious
vocational emphasis, are slightly higher,
and no other Arts subject is near. This
of course brings problems, and they
remain problems even though we can
take satisfaction in their very existence.
It becomes particularly important to
maintain staffing numbers in spite of the
current tightening of the University’s
belt – for which our fundraising project
has obvious relevance.
That project is now gaining
momentum. And there is one clear piece
of good news in the establishment by
Trinity and Churchill Colleges of a joint
College teaching post. So despite present
financial restrictions we have every
reason to be cheerful. 
Well before the next Newsletter
appears the Faculty will have a new
chairman, Professor Jane Heal. So,
wishing everyone all the best and hoping
to see many of you at the Alumni
Weekend in September, I sign off.
Edward Craig FBA
Knightbridge Professor of Philosophy
Chairman of the Philosophy Faculty
Board
“It’s the newspapers I can’t stand”
Onora O’Neill
One of Tom Stoppard’s characters
explained to another: “I’m with you
on the free press. It’s the newspapers I
can’t stand.” It is a thought many of
us have had. Are grisly newspapers an
inevitable cost of press freedom? If so,
why have British newspapers earned
worse reputations than those in other
countries where the press is free? Are
arguments for press freedom beyond
challenge? What exactly do the best
of them show? Do any of them show
that press freedom is unconditional? 
Four arguments for press freedom
are in common use. One is
jurisprudential: it simply appeals to
constitutional or other authorities
that proclaim rights to a free press,
such as the First Amendment to the
US Constitution (“Congress shall
make no law abridging the freedom
of the press”) and Article 10 of the
European Convention on Human
Rights (clause 1; but note clause 2!).
Unfortunately, arguments from
authority don’t provide deep
justifications. 
Other arguments go deeper. Press
freedom has been variously defended
as necessary for discovering truth, as
analogous to individual rights of self-
expression, and as required for
democracy. None of these lines of
thought justifies unconditional press
freedom. 
Appeals to truth seeking won’t
justify unconditional press freedom
because, as Bernard Williams points
out in Truth and Truthfulness, “in
institutions dedicated to finding out
the truth, such as universities,
research institutes, and courts of law,
speech is not at all unregulated.” Any
search for truth needs structures and
disciplines, and is undermined by
casual disregard of accuracy or
evidence. Unconditional freedom is
not optimal for truth-seeking. 
Appeals to rights to self-expression
also won’t justify unconditional press
freedom. John Stuart Mill argued that
individual freedom of expression
should be limited only by requirements
not to harm others, and then claimed
the same right for the press. The
analogy is unconvincing. Individuals
who are cavalier about accuracy may
do little harm (even so, there are laws
against libel, slander and inciting
hatred). Powerful organisations –
governments, businesses – that are
cavalier about accuracy can do great
harm. We don’t permit companies to
invent their balance sheets, or public
authorities their accounts and reports.
If powerful media conglomerates have
unconditional freedom of expression
they will be free to be cavalier about
accuracy, to harm others and to
undermine democracy. 
Appeals to democracy also won’t
justify unconditional press freedom,
since democracy needs a press that
informs citizens accurately. However,
if requirements for accurate reporting
are too tightly drawn, the press will
be intimidated. Nobody can be sure
of getting everything right – even with
zealous ‘fact checking’. So a press that
serves rather than damages
democracy needs to aim for accuracy:
we can require truthfulness, but not
truth. This standard can be met by
providing evidence, by including
caveats and qualifications, by prompt
correction of error, by distinguishing
reporting from commentary, rumour
and gossip. These and other forms of
epistemic responsibility allow readers
to judge for themselves. 
Ostensibly the British Press is
committed to accuracy. It is the first
demand in the Press Complaints
Commission’s Code. But good
reporting is a public good, not a
continued on page 8
In July 2004, the Royal Institute of
Philosophy annual conference was held in
Cambridge for the first time. I organised
the conference, together with Ross
Harrison, and the theme was ‘Preference-
Formation and Well-Being’. The idea was
to bring together moral philosophers,
political philosophers and philosophers
of economics to address a number of
questions concerning the formation of
preferences and its relevance for theories
of well-being. This was both a timely and
under-explored topic. In various debates
in moral and political philosophy,
preferences are thought to have
normative significance. For example,
their satisfaction is said to contribute to
individuals’ well-being; and the choices
that people make in line with their
preferences – such as the choice to pursue
a costly goal or ambition – are said to
legitimately justify inequalities. 
In all these debates, it is assumed that
the preferences individuals aim to satisfy,
and make choices on the basis of, are
‘authentic’ preferences, formed under
some but not other conditions (for
example, that they are not preferences
formed under hypnosis); or that they are
not ‘adaptive’, in the sense that they
should not be preferences formed in
stifling circumstances under which people
come to prefer what is readily available
over what is not. In other words, these
various debates assume some account of
preference-formation. Nonetheless,
despite the central importance of
accounts of preference-formation, there is
relatively little sustained and explicit
discussion of them. The conference was
intended to initiate such a discussion.
We were delighted to have, as our
speakers, Richard Arneson (University of
California, San Diego), Johan Brännmark
(University of Lund, Sweden), Daniel
Hausman (University of Wisconsin),
Philip Pettit (Princeton University),
Christian Piller (University of York),
Mozaffar Qizilbash (University of East
Anglia), Connie Rosati (University of
California, Davis), and Alex Voorhoeve
(LSE). The event was a successful one.
Both during the formal conference
sessions and outside them, participants
discussed a number of questions that
were being raised by the papers. These
included questions on the relation
between deliberation and preferences; on
whether we should always prefer to do
what is better; and on whether successful
parenting should be taken as a model
case of preference-formation. The success
of the conference and liveliness of the
debates that were set alight were in no
small part due to Katherine Harloe’s help
with the organisation, the ideal setting of
St. John’s College, and the financial
support of the Faculty of Philosophy and
the Analysis Trust.
A volume based on the conference,
which will also include further
contributions, will be published as a
special issue of Philosophy and as a self-
standing volume by Cambridge
Goldbach’s conjecture (every even
number greater than two is the sum of
two primes) has been confirmed for all
numbers less than 1016. Should that
count as evidence that it is likely to be
true? What can the behaviour of
adolescent monkeys tell us about the
nature of mathematics? These were
amongst many questions addressed at
the conference on ‘Mathematical
Knowledge’, held at Fitzwilliam College
in the summer 2004. This
interdisciplinary conference, organized
by Dominic Gregory, Mary Leng,
Alexander Paseau and Michael Potter,
aimed at bringing together
mathematicians, philosophers, and
psychologists to present their
perspectives on questions concerning
mathematical knowledge.
Our invited speakers thus included
two mathematicians (set theorist
Akihiro Kanamori, from Boston
University, and Fields medallist 
Timothy Gowers from Cambridge),
who presented us with practitioners’
views of the subject, as well as two
psychologists (Susan Carey from
Harvard, and Brian Butterworth from
UCL), who discussed the mind’s
capacities to acquire arithmetical
knowledge. Representing philosophy,
Mary Leng, Alexander Paseau and
Michael Potter were joined by Alan
Baker (Swarthmore), Mark Colyvan
(Queensland), Charles Parsons
(Harvard), Gideon Rosen (Princeton)
and Crispin Wright (St Andrews) to
discuss philosophical issues about
mathematical knowledge.
Having initially decided to hold a
philosophy of mathematics event in
Cambridge, we were led to the idea of
organizing an interdisciplinary conference
University Press, under the auspices of
the Royal Institute of Philosophy. 
Serena Olsaretti, University Lecturer in
Philosophy
Cambridge Conferences
Mathematical Knowledge Conference
The 2004 Annual Royal Institute of Philosophy Conference
Postgraduate Conference
The 8th Annual National Postgraduate
Analytic Philosophy Conference was held
at Magdalene College, Cambridge, in July
2004. The Conference consisted of
thirteen papers presented by graduates
from across Britain and the US. Over
eighty submissions were received and
thirteen were selected as the very best in
graduate work in analytic philosophy
today. Professor Onora O’Neill FBA,
provided a keynote address to 
complete the three-day event. A large
number of philosophy graduate 
students from all over the world met on
this occasion making the event a great
success.
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in part as a result of the high level of
interest in the philosophy of mathematics
amongst Cambridge mathematicians.
Since 2002, the Cambridge University
Society for the Philosophy of
Mathematics and Mathematical Sciences
(CUSPOMMS) has been holding
fortnightly seminars on the philosophy of
mathematics in the Centre for
Mathematical Sciences, organized by
undergraduate mathematicians and
philosophers. These seminars have
regularly attracted large audiences of
mathematicians and philosophers, and
showed the potential for fruitful
interactions between both groups, based
on a shared fascination with the nature of
mathematics.
The conference was well attended by
98 delegates from 16 countries,
representing disciplines including
philosophy, mathematics, psychology,
mathematics education, and computer
science. We would like to take this
opportunity to thank all of our speakers
and chairs, and our student helpers from
the CUSPOMMS committee, for their
contributions to a successful and
stimulating conference. We are also
grateful to the Analysis Trust, for
providing funding for student bursaries,
and especially to the Jesus College
Science and Human Dimension Project,
whose generous funding enabled us to
put together this ambitious event. Look
out for the book Mathematical
Knowledge, containing articles based on
talks presented at the conference, which
should appear next year.
Mary Leng, Research Fellow, 
St. John’s College
Events in 2005
Annual Heffer Lecture
Professor Frank Jackson of the
Australian National University will
deliver this year’s Heffer Lecture –
‘What we learn about reference from
asking why we have proper names’ –
on 13 May 2005, at 5pm in the Lady
Mitchell Hall, Sidgwick Site.
Alumni Weekend
‘A Philosophical Evening at Trinity’ 
Friday 23 September 2005 
Winstanley Lecture Theatre, 
Blue Boar Court, Trinity College
For over one hundred years
Cambridge has consistently produced
many of the most influential thinkers
and teachers in philosophy. But who
do you think has made the most
important impact? Come along and be
convinced by current Cambridge
philosophers who will champion the
cases for Bertrand Russell, Frank
Ramsey and Ludwig Wittgenstein.
There will be an opportunity for
questions and the evening will end in a
vote.
Cheese and wine will be served. 
For more information please contact
Mrs Angela Elliott, Faculty of
Philosophy – email: ae215@cam.ac.uk,
phone: +44 1223 330525
‘A Philosophy Lecture’
Saturday 24 September 2005
Sidgwick Site, Sidgwick Avenue.
“Who owns your ideas?”
This presentation will be given by
Alex Oliver and Dominic Scott, Co-
Directors of the Forum for Philosophy
in Business, in the Faculty of
Philosophy, and Lionel Bently, Herchel
Smith Professor of Intellectual
Property Law, in the Faculty of Law.
Intellectual property rights are fiercely
contested, not least in this University.
In what promises to be a lively and
challenging session, we shall explore
some of the ethical problems that lie at
the heart of these debates.
The lecture will be followed by a
reception in the Faculty of Philosophy.
Light refreshments will be served.
For more information please contact
Mrs Mariella Pellegrino
Faculty of Philosophy
email: mp10004@cam.ac.uk
Philosophy at Cambridge page 3 May 2005
How and when exactly did the
University of Cambridge come into
being? The question is debated. But at
least we know that it was not founded
in 287 AD by Athenian philosophers
in the train of Cantaber, Spanish son-
in-law of Gurguntius Brabtruc, King
of Britain, nor yet in the 7th century
by St Felix and Sigebert, King of the
Angles. (These fine stories appeared in
the 14th century as part of our historic
rivalry with Oxford.) Rather it is clear
that it came into being in the first
decade of the 13th century. And so the
University will shortly be gathering
itself to celebrate its 800th
anniversary.1
Another thing we are certain of is
that Philosophy has always been an
important part of the Cambridge
curriculum. Aristotle’s Logic, together
with Grammar and Rhetoric, provided
the foundation of the medieval
trivium, while Moral, Natural and
Metaphysical Philosophy were central
in the later years of study.
Philosophers were prominent in the
far-sighted 19th century movement
which reformed and reinvigorated the
University. And the great Cambridge
philosophers of the last century and a
half have been immensely influential,
not only in philosophy itself but in the
world more broadly.
For all of us who have studied or
practised Philosophy at Cambridge,
the depth and richness of this tradition
is something we relish and delight in.
It is part of what makes us who we are
and is something to be inspired by and
added to, both for its own sake and as
a legacy to our successors. But it is a
legacy which cannot be taken for
granted. 
Doubtless you are already familiar
with the rhetoric of fundraising – the
‘new challenges’, the ‘building on
traditions of excellence’ and so forth.
But what this rhetoric says is not less
true for its familiarity. When we look
at history, at the striking personalities
and the great achievements of the past,
we see that good things do not happen
unless someone makes them happen.
Facts, Fables and Funds
Jane Heal
So the question comes to us – what
responsibility for the future will we
take?
Our last appeal in 1997–8, drew a
warm response from our alumni,
whose generosity enabled our
accommodation, library, computing
and other facilities, especially for
graduate students, to be greatly
improved. As part of the University’s
800th anniversary campaign, to be
launched in the near future, we shall
be appealing to you again. The
constantly changing political and
financial circumstances of higher
education mean that the Faculty
cannot rely on a steady level of
support. Our aim is therefore to raise
money to provide a permanent fund
to endow the second Chair of
Philosophy (founded in 1896 and
hitherto neither named nor endowed),
and to sustain the work of the Faculty
more generally. If there is enough
support among the donors we would
like to name the chair for
Wittgenstein, who occupied it from
1939–47. This project, which will
greatly reinforce the Faculty’s security
and independence, has already
attracted several generous offers of
donations, and we have no doubt that
a very substantial sum will be raised. 
We are not at this moment asking
you directly for support – but we give
you frank warning that we shall do
so. (And of course we would be more
than delighted to hear from you if
you have ideas for the campaign or
would like to be involved.)
Meanwhile we would be very pleased
to see you at any of the various events
listed in this Newsletter. And if you
are in Cambridge, you are most
welcome to call in at the Faculty, to
find out more about what we are
doing. 
Jane Heal FBA
Professor of Philosophy
Secretary of the Endowment Fund
Appeal; email: bjh1000@cam.ac.uk
1 For more interesting details see A Concise History of the University of Cambridge by
Elisabeth Leedham-Green (CUP 1996).
The Faculty gratefully acknowledges support for
this newsletter from 3M library security systems.
In 1963 I anticipated later changes in
the UK economy by leaving
manufacturing for a service industry: in
my case, by leaving chemical
engineering at ICI to do a PhD on the
philosophy of probability at
Cambridge. I then discovered that this
subject is a very good example of the
intellectual service which Cambridge
philosophy renders to many disciplines.
Cambridge is a great place not only for
the mathematical theory of probability
and its scientific applications, but also
for its philosophical foundations. From
John Venn in the nineteenth century,
through Maynard Keynes, Frank
Ramsey and Richard Braithwaite in the
twentieth, to expatriates like Ian
Hacking and Donald Gillies now,
nowhere has contributed more than
Cambridge to our understanding of it.
Take Venn, the first great advocate
of a frequency view of the chances –
objective probabilities – postulated by
physicists, geneticists, meteorologists,
insurance companies and casinos: the
view that a smoker’s chance of getting
cancer, for example, is just the fraction
of smokers who do get cancer. Keynes,
by contrast, originated a logical view of
the so-called epistemic probabilities
used to measure how far evidence
supports conclusions drawn from it,
such as the verdicts of law courts, the
for acceptance by practitioners and
philosophers alike.
These controversies do not,
however, prevent the exposure of many
mistakes in the application of
probability, some of considerable
practical or theoretical importance.
Most people know that the so-called
‘gambler’s fallacy’ – the idea that, for
example, landing heads ten times in a
row makes a normal coin less likely to
land heads next time – is just that: a
fallacy. (If that sequence of heads tells
us anything, it tells us that the coin is
more likely to land heads than we
thought.)
Other errors can be less easy to spot.
Take the extreme probabilities invoked
when a defendant in, say, a rape case is
identified by DNA evidence. Suppose
for simplicity that the probability of a
false match – i.e. of DNA samples from
two different people matching – is one
in ten million, and that a sample from
the scene of the crime matches the
defendant’s DNA. It may be tempting,
given the enormous odds against a false
match, to think that this evidence alone
proves the defendant’s guilt. But it does
not. For suppose the only other
evidence about the rapist is that he is
an adult male in the UK, which
contains well over ten million such
males. Then all the DNA evidence tells
us is that the rapist is likely to be one
of at least two people, of whom the
defendant is one. So on this evidence
the epistemic probability that the
defendant is the rapist, far from being
over 99.99%, is less than 1⁄2, which is
too low to prove his guilt even on the
‘balance of probabilities’ needed to win
a civil case, let alone ‘beyond
reasonable doubt’, as required for a
criminal conviction.
Errors with fewer practical
implications but perhaps more
theoretical interest are made by some
cosmologists and theologians who are
over-impressed by the apparent
improbability of those features of our
universe needed to produce more or
less intelligent life. This so-called ‘fine-
tuning’ of our universe’s laws,
constants and initial conditions has
seemed to many to call for some
natural or supernatural explanation.
The latter may be that our universe
was made to support intelligent life; the
former that we live in a ‘multiverse’
containing many universes, with many
different features, which makes it not
only probable but inevitable that
results of clinical trials and
the acceptance or rejection
of scientific theories. And
Ramsey was the first to
make a subjective view of
probability credible by
showing how our
decisions are affected by –
and can be used to
measure – the probabilities
we attach to their possible
consequences: as when
people decide to stop
smoking because they
think they are less likely to
get cancer if they stop than
if they don’t.
On the face of it, these
three applications of
probability are quite
distinct. The chances of
rain tomorrow, of
offspring being male, of
catching flu, or of winning
a lottery, are features of
the natural or social world
that do not depend on
what we know or think
about them. Not so the
epistemic probabilities of a defendant’s
guilt, the safety of a new drug or the
theory of evolution by natural
selection: they only measure how far
our evidence counts for or against these
hypotheses. While subjective
probabilities measure neither of the
above, merely the actual strengths of
our beliefs, which are what determine
how we act when we are uncertain – as
we often are – of what effects our
actions will have.
Yet distinct though these three kinds
of probability are, they are not wholly
independent. They are not, for
example, like light, sound and water
waves, none of which implies anything
about the other two, despite all being
waves, i.e. all obeying similar
mathematical equations. Our three
kinds of probability, by contrast, are
linked by more than a shared
mathematics. Smokers’ chances of
getting cancer also tell us how far the
evidence that they smoke supports the
prediction that they will get cancer, and
therefore how probable we and they
should take that prospect to be. The
greatest challenge for philosophical
theories of probability is in fact to
explain not just these three applications
of it but why they are linked as they
are. That remains an unsettled
question, with rival theories still vying
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Uses and Abuses of Probability
Hugh Mellor
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We want to hear
from you!
The Editor welcomes all comments
and suggestions or material for
future editions of the Newsletter.
Please contact:
Mrs Mariella Pellegrino
Faculty of Philosophy
University of Cambridge
Sidgwick Avenue
Cambridge
CB3 9DA
U.K.
Phone: +44 1223 331889
Fax: +44 1223 335091
email: mp10004@cam.ac.uk
A downloadable version of the
Newsletter is available from the
Faculty website:
http://www.phil.cam.ac.uk/
intelligent life will arise only in the few
universes that can support it.
Where is the error in this? Not in
the platitudinous conclusion that life
can only arise in a universe that can
support it. The error lies in assuming
that such a universe is improbable in
any sense that makes its existence call
for explanation, an error rooted in a
failure to distinguish chances from
epistemic probabilities. Of course our
evidence gives the relevant features of
our universe a high epistemic
probability, since all this means is that
it tells us what those features are. It
does not follow from this that there is
any such thing as the chance of a
universe having these features, let alone
that only something like a design or
multiverse theory can make that chance
high enough to make our existence
unsurprising. Nor does this follow
from the fact that our universe could
have been different in many ways, most
of which would not have allowed it to
support life. The most that follows
from this is that the epistemic
probability of our kind of universe,
relative to no evidence at all, would
have been very low, which again is just
to say that it’s only the evidence –
including the evidence of our own
existence – which tells us what our
universe is like.
None of this shows that design or
multiverse theories are false, merely
that some bad but common reasons for
thinking or wanting them to be true are
based on too undiscriminating a view
of probability. A more discriminating
view helps us to adopt the attitude
expressed in Thomas Carlyle’s alleged
comment on one Margaret Fuller’s
reported remark that she accepted the
universe: ‘Gad,’ said Carlyle, ‘she had
better.’ And so, I think, had we.
D. H. Mellor FBA 
Emeritus Professor of Philosophy
His book Probability: A
Philosophical Introduction
(Routledge, 2005) is available in
hardback and paperback. 
I was slightly surprised to be asked to
write about philosophy at Cambridge
because I wasn’t exactly a stellar student.
My first two years of Tripos were tricky
for many reasons. Boys, alcohol and the
ten plays I just had to act in didn’t really
help. After year one I tried to change to
English but that Faculty cleverly dodged
my eagerness suggesting my essays were
just too ‘philosophically minded’. Despite
their claims, I knew I wasn’t adept at
philosophy – the disciplined structures of
logical arguments were alien to my
kaleidoscopic, scatter-gun way of
thinking. I wanted to understand, I was
fascinated, but it was as if everyone else
involved in philosophy was following a
script I hadn’t been issued.
Things started to make more sense in
my third year. This was partly due to the
addition of aesthetics. Finally there was a
subject I had an affinity for, which I was
able to combine with another new
passion, film. These two curiosities led to
two extended essays, one on Arthur Danto
and the other on the glamour of horror
films. I left with an acceptable degree but I
was most proud of those essays.
I’m now a film director and producer.
After Cambridge I worked briefly as a
runner for a company that made lifestyle
cookery programmes for cable television.
Not feeling entirely satisfied, I wrote
hundreds of letters trying to get a job in
film. One of the people I targeted was a
producer who had made his name in
horror films. He had read my CV and
one day called saying he wanted to talk
to me about my Cambridge essays. Why
did people enjoy being scared out of their
wits by horror films? Why had he spent
his life making them? I refused to
enlighten him until he gave me a job.
A week later I was working as his
assistant. A month later
he was sacked off the
film, but by luck I kept
my job and although the
film was a critical flop of
extraordinary
proportions, I finally had
my foot in the door.
Sadly I never had time to
divulge the secrets of my essay to the
producer before he packed his bags for
LA, but without it who knows Nanette
Newman and I might still be working
together.
Since then I have set up the low
budget division of Working Title Films
and was closely involved in the making of
Billy Elliot and the horror flick My Little
Eye. I’m now producing an IMAX film
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Recollections
Seven Years at Cambridge
Jamie Whyte
(Darwin, St. John’s, Corpus)
In 1985 I was an undergraduate at
Auckland University studying philosophy.
A travelling salesman had pinned up an
advertisement for the LSE masters degree.
I was seriously considering it.
At the same time, the department was
visited by Hugh Mellor. When I
mentioned the LSE, he suggested that I
was aiming 50 miles too low. I should
apply to do the MPhil in the History and
Philosophy of Science at Cambridge (the
Philosophy MPhil did not then exist).
That’s what I did. I will be glad if I
make an equally good decision in the
second half of my life. 
In my seven years at Cambridge, the
university’s various institutions provided
me with two degrees, a job (I was a
research fellow at Corpus), two fiancées
and one wife.
It may seem strange to say that
Cambridge provided me with fiancées
and a wife. But it reflects the fact that
Cambridge takes over not just your
education but your life. This is especially
true for foreign students. With no old
friends or family within striking distance,
a square mile of colleges, libraries, lecture
halls, common rooms and pubs becomes
your whole world. And, as far as you are
inclined to notice, it is populated by no
one but other students and fellows, in
which your arcane enquiries are the
burning issues of the day.
Apart from All Blacks matches, I
watched no TV. Politics, in which I had
been actively engaged, faded in my
consciousness, until it seemed to concern
another planet. Great cultural
movements, such as the emergence of
‘Brit art’, failed to draw my attention.
This temporary loss of the external
world was beneficial. It allowed me to
concentrate on philosophy with an
intensity that I do not think I would have
managed in a city university, or even
Jamie Whyte
on the rebuilding of the World Trade
Center and last year wrote and directed
my first film Hotel Infinity which is doing
the international festival circuit. This
short is about a man who understood his
unusual hotel by rigorous mathematical
calculations. 
Those years at Cambridge have had a
deep impact on me. I’m glad I didn’t
change subject and sometimes think
about studying aesthetics again. Trying to
understand a foreign way of thinking was
good for me and there are many
moments and ideas from that time I often
ponder. From the superb lecture about
Beauty which discussed the voices of
Maria Callas and Billie Holiday; to the
hilarious political philosopher whose
mantle piece was littered with crude
sketches of tomb stones under which
‘Past Cambridge Students’ was written.
In my report he wrote ‘she deserves not
to do well but I have a feeling she is an
over-achiever’. That line will appear in a
film, mark my words.
Equally unforgettable were the
supervisions I had with my Director of
Studies. She had an amazing skill at
turning my head upside-down. In the first
five minutes I would be made to see things
from a position I had never considered.
My essays in the first year weren’t
researched well. But in the last two years I
was working hard and she still had the
ability to make me see afresh. I would like
to create films that do the same thing –
that show another possible vision of the
world, tell tales from another angle. 
The similarities to my work today and
my forays in philosophy don’t end there
and indeed it may not be a coincidence
that one of the directors I admire,
Terrence Malik, is also a philosopher.
Now, just as then, I struggle with
structure. I’m interested
in thoughts and
emotions but I still have
to fight to make a good
story without letting it
strangle my ideas. What
film and philosophy
ultimately have in
common is that they
both deal with the known, unknown and
the unknowable. Don’t even get me
started on the complexities of trying to
make an original and successful film. As
William Goldman famously put it
“Nobody knows anything”. Well I
certainly wouldn’t argue with that.
Amanda Boyle is a film producer and
director
Nobody Knows Anything: Philosophy, Film and Me
Amanda Boyle (St. John’s)
from Hotel Infinity, by Amanda Boyle
Since its launch in 2002, the Forum for
Philosophy in Business has been dedicated
to strengthening the link between academic
philosophy and practitioners in business
and public life. No one high up in a large
organisation can avoid grappling with
abstract problems. The Forum provides a
space to think, enabling them to articulate
and address such concerns. As Aristotle
said: ‘It is impossible to untie a knot that
one does not understand.’ Philosophy is
able to isolate the different
strands in the knot and help
point the way forward.
When we started, the idea of
bringing together philosophers
and practitioners in this way
was very much an experiment –
a chemical experiment, if one
thinks of the potential for
explosive reactions. But to
judge from the range and
calibre of interested
practitioners over the last year,
this experiment is proving
extremely successful.
Throughout 2004, we engaged in research
on trust funded by a Faculty Award from
IBM. We looked at trust in different
contexts – in the civil service, the
professions and the media. Participants at
one seminar included Sir David Omand
(Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator,
Cabinet Office), Anthony Williams (former
HM Inspector of Constabulary) and Lord
Wilson (former Cabinet Secretary), as well
as senior figures from the medical,
actuarial and accounting professions. At
the seminar on trust in the media
participants included Philip Graf (Press
Complaints Commission), Dame Patricia
Hodgson (former Chief Executive of the
Independent Television Commission), John
Lloyd (Editor, FT Magazine), Graham
Mather (President, European Policy
Forum). On the philosophical side we are
greatly indebted to Simon Blackburn, Ross
Harrison and Onora O’Neill for their
contributions and support.
The Forum operates in a number of ways:
• With sponsorship from outside
organisations, we organise seminars and
conferences (normally in Cambridge),
bringing together participants with very
different backgrounds. We are grateful
to IBM and the consultants SHM for
their support in this area.
• We also take on projects sponsored by
specific organisations, private or public
sector. For instance, we are working with
Acevo (The Association of Chief
Executives of Voluntary Organisations)
on a project examining public trust in
charities. Nick Aldridge, Acevo’s Head of
Policy and Communications, is a recent
Cambridge Philosophy alumnus. Our
industrial links include BT and Pfizer.
• Our research feeds directly into the
Tripos. We are currently running a
seminar series investigating whether
corporations are in any sense persons or
morally responsible agents. We have
also conducted a philosophical audit of
company corporate social responsibility
statements and ‘business principles’ –
from BAT to the Body Shop. We are
pleased to report that the undergraduates
are as sharp as ever, and left no target
standing.
We would like to thank the many alumni
who wrote in to express their support for
the Forum and to suggest possible avenues
for research. Please keep up the dialogue
and please come to the forthcoming 2005
Alumni weekend (see ‘Events’), when we
will be discussing the ethics of intellectual
property with Prof Lionel Bently of the
Cambridge Law Faculty.
Alex Oliver and Dominic Scott
For information about the Forum, see
www.phil.cam.ac.uk
The Forum can be contacted at the
Faculty’s address or via email
(phil-forum@lists.cam.ac.uk)
from left, Professor Ross Harrison, 
Mr Graham Mather and Mr Philip Graf
perhaps in Oxford. I finished my PhD in
slightly under three years. My speed was
assisted by a rapidly growing overdraft
and by not joining the University Library.
Libraries, like churches, have always
given me the creeps: all that hushed
reverence. This saved me from wasting
hours every day flirting and gossiping in
the UL coffee shop.
My research concerned truth and
mental representation. Several
philosophers at Cambridge – David
Papineau, Tom Baldwin and Hugh
Mellor, among others – were then
working on the same or closely related
topics. Most of what I have learnt in
philosophy, I got from these people and
the way they approached the subject. 
Philosophy can easily descend into a
point-scoring game where victory is to be
had, not by answering philosophical
questions, but by refuting others’
answers. That was not the culture I
encountered at Cambridge. I usually felt
that discussions were collaborative efforts
aimed at getting to the truth. 
It helped that influential figures in the
Faculty – especially Hugh Mellor –
disagreed with Wittgenstein and believed
that philosophical problems were both
real and solvable. When that is what you
believe, debate will often be robust, but
not petty or pointless. 
Cambridge philosophy then had a
reputation for treating speakers harshly. I
think it was exaggerated. Some speakers
got roughed up; Cambridge philosophy
never has been, and hopefully never will
be, a touchy-feely love-fest. More often,
however, seminars turned into ‘working
sessions’ where contributions from the
audience aimed at developing the speaker’s
ideas or suggesting solutions to problems. 
The prestige of a PhD from Cambridge
is valuable. It has helped me get jobs inside
and outside academia. But what has
helped me to do those jobs, and now to
write professionally about politics and
logic, is what I learnt at Cambridge. It was
not a body of information; philosophy
isn’t that kind of subject. It was the values
of intellectual honesty and rigour.
When faced with difficult decisions,
many American Christians ask
themselves: ‘what would Jesus do?’ I
don’t. But sometimes when I am writing
something for public consumption about
which I am not quite sure, I ask myself,
‘how would this go down at the Moral
Sciences Club?’ The real benefit of my
seven years at Cambridge is that I can
answer that question.
Jamie Whyte is an author and freelance
journalist
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science, and noted optimistically that
philosophers are taking an increased
interest in genealogy. Heal was more
cautious. She was happy that so many
intelligent people are philosophers, but
expressed concern that the volume of
philosophical literature is becoming so
large that it is escaping from
philosophers. Philosophy should allow its
participants to sit back and think for
fifteen or twenty years. 
Here we saw alienation between
philosophy and philosophers,
foreshadowing some of the tensions
highlighted by Geuss. Although we can
see the flaws in our own creation, it is
unclear how to change it for the better.
Geuss also noted that only two ‘schools’
of philosophers – the positivists and the
Hegelians (both left and right) – were
immune to the attractions of National
Socialism, and thus cast doubt on the
ability of philosophy and philosophers to
do more than justify extant systems.
Amidst such weighty material, we
were also treated to light-hearted insights
and hilarious anecdotes, most memorably
the stunning impressions, by Blackburn
and Heal, of the ‘Wittgenstein-slump’:
body posture de rigueur of post-
Wittgenstein Cambridge. The sheer
intellectual and emotional variety
displayed during the series reveals that
the philosopher’s life – the examined life
– is self-evidently worth living and worth
examining, and that sometimes these
cannot be properly distinguished.
In 2005, the ASC is holding a series of
‘Confrontations’, reenacting famous
incendiary disputes from the history of
philosophy. 
http://www.cam.ac.uk/societies/asc/
Tim Button is an MPhil student
description of his love of philosophy with
the paradox that he is drawn to it in
alternating waves of optimism and
pessimism about the possibility of societal
change.
What is philosophy for these
philosophers? Mellor argued that it is not
a spectator sport: only those who can
philosophise can really criticise or enjoy
the subject. But Lipton noted that the
boundaries of philosophy are vague.
Much of philosophy is ‘philosophy of X’,
where X is some other subject (e.g.
science), and the philosophy of X is
usually also found within the X-subject
itself. But while many other subjects need
to justify themselves in terms of the
practical value of what they do, ‘studying
philosophy is self-justifying.’
Philosophy captures something of the
scale of cosmology, Heal argued, but in
the study of people. With the subject so
loosely defined, it could only be a
question of examining your life. All sorts
of question arise during this enterprise,
only some of which will interest you.
Little wonder then that what is called
‘philosophy’ varies so much across
cultures and times.
With the human condition at its core,
Hanna claimed that philosophy aims ‘to
get a priori insight into this subject
matter, whether cognitively or non-
cognitively.’ The first is ‘conceptual
analysis’; the second is Aristotle’s
‘wonder’ or Wittgenstein’s ‘mystical’.
Philosophy is a synthesis between the
two. This found resonance in Mellor’s
argument that philosophy cannot be
purely analytic, since analysis provides
too little metaphysics and an analytic
argument (e.g. a mathematical one) is
won by knockout, but philosophical
arguments are won on points. 
What does the future of philosophy
hold? Blackburn enthused about recent
progress in logic and philosophy of
The Amoral Sciences Club, under-
graduate foil to the Moral Sciences Club,
last year organised a series of talks
entitled ‘Justify Yourself’. Five Cambridge
stalwarts – Simon Blackburn, Hugh
Mellor, Jane Heal, Peter Lipton and
Raymond Geuss – and one visiting
scholar – Bob Hanna – bravely justified
themselves and their subject. 
Mellor started the series by
distinguishing two senses in which
philosophy might require justification:
either as a professional practice or in
itself. To attempt to justify philosophy
itself would mistakenly treat philosophy
as a means to an end, rather than as an
end in itself. Accordingly, he said little
about philosophy per se.
Mellor claimed that the professional
practice of philosophy is for a society, not
an individual, to justify. Society sets aside
funding for professional philosophers,
and we may rightly ask what the
appropriate level of funding should be.
However, since society makes some
money available to philosophers, there’s
no reason why he shouldn’t take
advantage of that and make a living out
of what he loved.
Jane Heal asked us to imagine a
society in which professional philosophy
was not supported. She conjectured that
such a society would be largely uniform,
with an enforced, dictatorial orthodoxy,
or it would be comprised of turnips,
incapable of reflection. 
The distinction between professional
and pure philosophy was invoked by
Hanna in a different context. He feared
that the pursuit of tenure can obliterate
the love of the subject. For him ‘getting
“interested” in philosophy was precisely
like falling in love: hot & cold flushes,
shivers, complete absorption in it to the
neglect of everything else, alternating
manic intellectual excitement & abysmal
depression.’ Geuss supplemented his
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consumer product, and complaints
procedures for individuals can’t
secure public goods. This doesn’t
show that a self-regulating free press
can’t achieve adequate standards. It
shows that the weak self-regulation
that we currently have in the UK is
inadequate. If we think statutory
regulation of the press too risky, we
need more serious self-regulation. 
Professor Onora O’Neill FBA is
Principal of Newnham College,
Cambridge
Faculty News
This year again many members of the Faculty have had their achievements
recognised by promotions, awards, elections and invitations to give lectures
around the globe.
It would be impossible to list them all but here are a few highlights:
Simon Blackburn gave the Jack Smart lecture at the Australian National
University and the Lindley lecture at Kansas. Ross Harrison was promoted
to a Personal Chair; from September 2005 he will be the Quain Professor in
Jurisprudence, University College, London. Onora O’Neill will be the next
President of the British Academy, from July 2005. Michael Potter was
promoted to a Readership. 
A number of our graduate students and Research Fellows have secured
jobs in philosophy academia, among them are: Carrie Jenkins at St. Andrews,
Fiona Macpherson at Bristol, Alex Paseau at Wadham College, Oxford.
Justify Yourself – Tim Button
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